22-Sep-15: If Iran's march to a nuclear arsenal leaves US officials comfortable and satisfied, how should the rest of us feel?

Before we drill down into what has just happened in Iran, and some astounding words of explanation from an official spokesperson for the US government, a few words of introduction.

The intentionally-unsigned nuclear weapons development deal that media reports keep wrongly calling a “signed” agreement, made in July between Iran and the United States (accompanied by a few other countries that also did not sign) is being widely hailed by those who support it as unprecedented in its rigor and of vast significance. Whatever people think of its merits, it's clearly one of the most weighty pacts to have happened in our lifetimes.

Over here in Israel where Iran's blood-curdling threats of murder and destruction ["25-Aug-15: Hard to ignore how much Iran believes its old goals are the right goals"] are not merely the stuff of headlines (or footnotes) but amount to a genuine, massive-scale physical threat, there's wall-to-wall opposition to it, along with fear, trepidation and incomprehension. 

We can't help but notice how most Americans, far less threatened than we are but no less capable of reading news reports, agree with us.

As the ultimate owner of the process, President Obama himself spared no superlatives in singing the praises of the framework that preceded the pact:

"This deal is not based on trust. It's based on unprecedented verification," he said. Part of that verification, Obama said, was "the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history.” [Public Radio International, April 8, 2015]

Then once the agreement was finally not signed, the praise from figures deep within the political process rose several notches, starting with the president himself who, speaking from the White House, said

We don't trust Iran... But this deal doesn't rely on trust. It relies on verification [and] The commitment to Israel is sacrosanct...

The amen choir rapidly chimed in, mainly along partisan party-political lines. Democratic senator from California Dianne Feinstein called it

historic. It offers a verifiable, diplomatic resolution to one of our most pressing national security challenges. This is a strong agreement that meets our national security needs and I believe will stand the test of time. I stand behind the U.S. negotiating team and will support this agreement in the Senate.. .Iran will be subject to unprecedented and highly intrusive inspections to verify it is living up to its commitments. The IAEA will have 24-hour access to all declared nuclear sites and this agreement provides a process for inspection of military bases. No sites are off limits to inspection... [Source, July 14, 2015]

California's second Democratic senator, Barbara Boxer, spoke of the “unprecedented inspections and verification regime” in endorsing it. Along similar lines, Bill Nelson, Florida's Democratic senator, reiterated that:

this agreement can't be built on trust. We must have a good enough mechanism in place to catch them when and if they cheat; in other words, don't trust but verify. [C-SPAN, August 4, 2015]

Large parts of the mainstream media joined in. For instance: "Iran nuke deal depends on most intrusive inspection system ever", McClatchey, July 14, 2015]

And there were the lobbyists:

That's why this deal is so important: by subjecting Iran to the most intrusive inspections regime in history, it leaves nothing to trust. Inspections at all nuclear sites. 24/7/365 monitoring. Tracking every ounce of uranium. It all adds up to unprecedented assurance that Iran cannot cheat their way to a weapon undetected. [From the Iran Deal Facts website, the work of a political group closely aligned with the White House]

In fact, there has been colossal amount of parroting going on as those on the side of this agreement provide reasons political or moral or logical for why it could hardly be better, and how trust doesn't come into it. Not at all. Not even a little.

This leaves those of us astounded at the unforgivable weakness being displayed by the US side, along with the ongoing unbalanced concessions, wondering what's really going on. And wondering whether the news of this past weekend has caused the holders of any of these utterly-certain viewpoints to undergo some self-doubt.

The wondering is still going on. Only now the contradictions between the case for the unsigned pact and reality are mounting.

The following somewhat bizarre exchange between the official spokesperson of the United States Department of State and a journalist we think is Matt Lee from Associated Press took place at yesterday’s (Monday’s) daily press briefing at the State Department. The text below is extracted without change from the official transcript and appears on the State Department website here.

The head of the IAEA found time in his weekend visit
to call on Rouhani, the Iranian president [Image Source]

The dueling between the two relates to what did and did not happen inside one of the most significant of the Iranian military/nuclear facilities ["06-Aug-15: Parchin: Keep the name in mind"] this past weekend when the head of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, came visiting. 

Soil samples were taken during the visit. And lo and behold, exactly what critics of the JCPOA said was going to happen (because of a secret side deal between Iran and IAEA), happened:

[A] top Iranian official said that IAEA inspectors had not taken part in the sampling procedure at Parchin. Iranian technicians took the samples and handed them to the IAEA, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran spokesman Behruz Kamalvandi was quoted in Iranian state media as saying. ["IAEA inspects Iran's Parchin military site for first time", CNN, September 21, 2015]

(Worth noting that when reports first emerged that Iran was going to be doing the soil sampling of its suspected nuclear facilities on its own and without anyone watching, supporters of the Iran deal said this was mere rumors, and that Israel was probably behind them. Turns out they weren't rumors at all.) Amano's own words after emerging from Parchin are enough to get ordinary worried people like us thinking:

This was the first time that the Agency had visited the location. We entered a building which the Agency had previously only been able to observe using satellite imagery. Inside the building, we saw indications of recent renovation work. There was no equipment in the building. Our experts will now analyse this information and we will have discussions with Iran in the coming weeks, as foreseen in the Road-map. ["IAEA Director General's Remarks to the Press on Visit to Iran", September 21, 2015]

State's John Kirby [Image Source]

It would be a pity to highlight some of the words, and not highlight others. The whole State Department media briefing exchange from yesterday is simply breathtaking. 

QUESTION: Thank you. The two main areas of what I wanted to ask you about have already been asked at the White House and answered – well, kind of answered – but I’m going to give it a whirl anyway. Let’s start with Iran.
MR KIRBY: With what?
QUESTION: Iran --
MR KIRBY: Okay.
QUESTION: -- and the inspections of Parchin. And your colleague at the White House was asked whether the Administration is satisfied with the process that we saw unfold over the past couple of days. I just wanted to make sure that you’re on board with his answer; he said yes.
MR KIRBY: Yes, we are.
QUESTION: You are. And you don’t have any issue with fact that the inspectors were not allowed in, or that they were not there?
MR KIRBY: I would point you, Matt, to what the director general himself noted, which was that the verification activities at Parchin were conducted in the manner consistent with their standard safeguards practices. So the director general himself made it clear that he was comfortable with the verification process and that it was in keeping with the arrangement that they had made with Iran.
QUESTION: That’s great, but you – so you don’t have a problem with them not being physically present?
MR KIRBY: I’m not going to get into the details of the process itself. That resides inside this confidential arrangement between Iran and the IAEA, so I’m not going to confirm or deny whether inspectors were present here or there. What I am going to say is we’re comfortable that the process was conducted in accordance with the normal procedures and the agreement that the IAEA had already made with Iran.
QUESTION: And so it remains your position that the confidential agreement and whatever it contains is sufficient to investigate? Okay.
MR KIRBY: Absolutely. And again, I’d point you to the fact that Director General Amano made it clear before and I think certainly made the implication today that there’s no self-inspection by Iran in this process.
QUESTION: There – okay. The other thing, at the – that your colleague at the White House seemed to suggest was that the courtesy call that Director General Amano made to Parchin was somehow evidence that – or was evidence that the Iranian military facilities are open and available for IAEA access. Is that really – is that the position of the State Department?
MR KIRBY: Well, in a short answer: yes. I mean, it’s not insignificant that the IAEA and the director general himself – I mean, I don’t know that we would characterize it as a courtesy call –but the fact that he and his team had access to Parchin is not insignificant.
QUESTION: His team, meaning the one person that went with him.
MR KIRBY: Look, I don’t – I’m not going to --
QUESTION: A brief – a brief visit to an empty room at Parchin, you think counts – qualifies as an inspection? That – was that the –
MR KIRBY: It’s not insignificant that they had access to Parchin. The director general himself – and I’m not going to get into the details of his visit or what that – that’s for the IAEA to speak to. But it’s not insignificant that they got – that they were granted access to this.
QUESTION: Is it your understanding that the director general of the IAEA conducts inspections? Or would that normally be done by --
MR KIRBY: I’m not an expert on their --
QUESTION: -- lower-level people?
MR KIRBY: I’m not an expert on their protocols. I don’t think it’s our expectation that he has to personally inspect everything.
QUESTION: Do you think he got down on his hands and knees and --
MR KIRBY: I’d point you to the director general to speak to his personal involvement. I don’t know that that’s our expectation, that he has to, as you said, get down on his hands and knees. But certainly he had access to Parchin, and that’s not insignificant – the first time that that’s been done. If we had this --
QUESTION: Well, do you recall how big a site Parchin is?
MR KIRBY: I don’t. I’m not an expert on the site itself.
QUESTION: It’s rather large.
QUESTION: It’s pretty huge.
MR KIRBY: Okay.
QUESTION: So do you think that two people from the IAEA going into an empty room briefly --
MR KIRBY: Matt.
QUESTION: -- counts – I’m trying to find out whether you guys think or are trying to say that Amano’s courtesy call, his very brief visit – he even said that it was very brief – counts as some kind of an inspection. That’s all.
MR KIRBY: I would point you to what the IAEA has said about their --
QUESTION: Not even the IAEA said this was an inspection, but your colleague at the White House suggested that the fact that Director General Amano was able to briefly visit one room or one part of the site was evidence that the Iranians have opened up their military sites to IAEA access. And I just want to know if the State Department thinks that it’s – thinks the same.
MR KIRBY: We believe it’s significant that Iran granted access to this facility at Parchin for the first time in the history of this issue, both in his visit and the technical verification activities. What’s more important is we look forward to Iran’s fulling implementing its commitments under the roadmap. That’s what matters here.
QUESTION: Would you be confident in this being the standard of inspection going forward?
MR KIRBY: It’s not that that is – this is an issue between Iran and the IAEA, and as we said at the very outset, Brad, that having been briefed on the details of that confidential arrangement, the Secretary remains comfortable that it will allow for the IAEA to get the proper access it needs and the ability, through various techniques, of effectively monitoring.
QUESTION: But you don’t think there needs to be – you’re not saying that whatever the confidential arrangements are of future inspections going forward, that they will have necessarily more access than this?
MR KIRBY: That is between the IAEA and Iran to work out. What matters to us, we’re not going to micromanage the inspection activities of the IAEA. It’s an independent, international agency that can speak for itself about what it will or will not do. And as you know, many of those arrangements are confidential and they won’t speak to them. What matters to us, having been briefed on the protocols, is that we remain comfortable, should this – should Iran continue to meet its commitments in keeping with that arrangement, we believe they will get the access and will get the information they need.
But look, this is the first visit, so – at least to Parchin anyway. So we have a ways to go here. As I said, there’s a roadmap that has to be implemented, and we expect Iran to meet its commitments.QUESTION: Wait, are you saying that – are you saying this is the first visit? You’re expecting there will be more?
MR KIRBY: I don’t know. I’m saying it is a fact that it’s first visit. I’m not making prognostications about the future.
QUESTION: My last one and I’ll defer to anyone else that wants to ask. Are you – do you know if members of Congress in their confidential briefings with Administration officials, which would have included people from this building, including the Secretary, were told that IAEA inspectors would have direct access and be able to take their own samples at Parchin?
MR KIRBY: I do not know what specifics of the confidential arrangement were briefed to members of Congress.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR KIRBY: What we’ve said all along is that – and the director general himself had said – that reports that Iran would be self-inspecting were not accurate, and that he himself was comfortable in the protocols laid out in the arrangement.
QUESTION: That’s not my question. Were they --
MR KIRBY: Well, your question is do I know what Congress were briefed.
QUESTION: Do you know – several members of Congress came out and said that they had been told by the Administration that there would be inspections by IAEA personnel. Do you know if they were told that by the Administration or is that outside --
MR KIRBY: I’m not going to comment on specific communications about a confidential arrangement with members of Congress. What I will go back to say, though, is having been briefed on this arrangement, the Secretary remains comfortable that if Iran meets its side of it, that the IAEA will get the access and the information it needs to properly verify compliance.
QUESTION: Can I change subject?
MR KIRBY: Sure.

Worth recalling what comedian Jackie Mason said about this recently: that in New York City, the restaurants get more intensive inspections from health inspector than the US agreement with Iran calls for. Only the food officials get genuine anytime, anywhere access rights. Because, you know, a spoiled tuna sandwich can really ruin things. 

Incredible, in the literal sense of the word. 

And it's getting clearer that the ruling clique in Tehran do indeed pay attention to the American news media [see "24-Jul-15: If the Iranians read the Wall Street Journal, we're all in deep trouble"]

06-Aug-15: Parchin: Keep the name in mind

On the devastating nuclear war and terror issues, they lead the US
negotiating team: Secretary of State John Kerry, Energy Secretary
Ernest Moniz [Image Source]

It's now summer vacation time in Washington DC where the Congress is part-way through a 60 day-review of a transaction that has deep and irreversible consequences for the struggle against Islamist terror and for the well-being of us here in Jerusalem and all of our neighbours - among many others.

But first: one of the core motives for us writing this blog and digging through publicly available open-source materials for insights is the gnawing sense that terror, and especially the activities of those who make it possible, is consistently misunderstood by most people. Iran and its nuclear plans constitutes a clear instance of the problem.

Much about the Iran Nuclear Enablement Deal™ - not its official name - seems bizarre to us, starting with how it is embodied in an unsigned agreement which most of the news media keep calling "signed" [we offered the evidence a week ago: "29-Jul-15: Built not on trust but on... verification", and suggested why this is important - and we remain totally perplexed by how little noticed this reality is].

And though it was immediately endorsed unanimously by the United Nations, it's an agreement which one of the sides (Iran) says to its people is non-binding; in fact, they're already saying they will walk away from it.

Despite the heat and the laid-back mood in evidence at the US Congress, the news from Iran continues to happen. They're not on vacation:

Iran Already Sanitizing Nuclear Site, Intel Warns | Bloomberg View | August 5, 2015 | Eli Lake and Josh Rogin |
The U.S. intelligence community has informed Congress of evidence that Iran was sanitizing its suspected nuclear military site at Parchin, in broad daylight, days after agreeing to a nuclear deal with world powers... Intelligence officials and lawmakers who have seen the new evidence, which is still classified, told us that satellite imagery picked up by U.S. government assets in mid- and late July showed that Iran had moved bulldozers and other heavy machinery to the Parchin site and that the U.S. intelligence community concluded with high confidence that the Iranian government was working to clean up the site ahead of planned inspections by the IAEA... For senior lawmakers in both parties, the evidence calls into question Iran’s intention to fully account for the possible military dimensions of its current and past nuclear development... Secretary of State John Kerry has said that the U.S. government has “absolute knowledge” about what Iran has done in the past. Ahead of the vote on the agreement next month, many lawmakers don't share Kerry's confidence. Iran would seem to have its doubts as well, since it's still trying to cover its tracks...

There's substantiation for this in a just-published Institute for Science and International Security (the other ISIS) brief that terms the Iranian cover-up

"a last ditch effort to try to ensure that no incriminating evidence will be found..." [ISIS Imagery Brief: Renewed Activity at the Parchin Site in Iran | David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, August 5, 2015]

That same Bloomberg View report points back to one of the most humiliating and disturbing aspects of United States confidence that they have Iran's penchant for making serious trouble under control. It involves Parchin, a vast Iranian military complex with dozens of structures above ground and an unknown number below.

Back in 2004

Images of Parchin base show buildings that could be used to test nuclear bomb components, the Institute for Science and International Security said. A US official said concern about the site should be included in a UN report on Iran's nuclear activities. Iran says allegations it is hiding nuclear facilities at Parchin are lies. [see "Suspicion over Iran arms facility", BBC, September 16, 2004]

Three years after that, a U.S. National Intelligence Assessment determined "with high confidence" that 

in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program... the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program... was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. [New York Times, December 4, 2007]

But, as later emerged, this high U.S. confidence was (ahem) misplaced, and

it turns out the NIE was misleading even on its own terms: Iran did have a covert facility, perhaps for enrichment, and the intelligence community knew or at least strongly suspected it. We are also learning that the NIE's judgment puts the U.S. intelligence community at odds with its counterparts in Britain, Germany and Israel, which have evidence to show that Iran resumed its weaponization work after 2003... [Intelligence Fiasco Footnote | The authors of the 2007 Iran NIE have some explaining to do", Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2009] 

The Obama White House naturally knows all of this, including the intelligence failure (if that's what it was) and has been telling analysts and lawmakers for the past two years that the deal on which they were working to stop Iran's nuclear weapons plan would absolutely have to include "robust access" by IAEA inspectors to Parchin. To illustrate:

• Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, told Congress on December 12, 2013 that Iran would be required to "address past and present practices... including Parchin" [source]
• State Department spokesperson Marie Harf (about whose self-described difficulties we have commented frequently) confidently stated to reporters on April 3, 2015 that we, meaning the government of the United States, "would find it... very difficult to imagine a JCPA that did not require such [inspector] access at Parchin" [State Department transcript] 

Unjustified hubris notwithstanding, that too turns out to be misleading and wrong.

In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing about Parchin, Senator James Risch of Idaho revealed two weeks ago that it will not be the inspectors of the IAEA but Iran's own military who will be taking and providing soil samples from Iran:

"How in the world can you have a nation like Iran doing their own testing? ...[Are we going to trust Iran to do this? This is a good deal? This is what we were told we were going to get when we were told that don't worry, we're going to be watching over their shoulder and put in place verification that are absolutely bullet proof. We're going to trust Iran to do their own testing? This is absolutely ludicrous." [Senator James Risch speaking in Congress (video here), July 23, 2015]

That's how the world's public learned that negotiators for the United States had covertly abandoned the requirement that we were told had been central to the US negotiating position - a surrender, in simple terms. And evidently one of many. (YouTube has a video on this from Fox News.)

A little more food for thought: when the IAEA's inspectors went to Parchin in 2012, they were blocked at the gates and did not get in.

In some ways, what's worse than critically key information being withheld from the public (concealed is not too strong a word in our view) is that the US Secretary of State, along with his key negotiating colleague, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, answered (it's in the same video link) the Congressional committee and for the record that the relevant information, essentially a side-agreement, was classified (secret?). In fact, the source documents are not even in the possession of the US, though it's obvious to anyone who thinks about it that the US could get the documents if they wanted, and without having to threaten anyone with violence.

In any event, reporters from Associated Press ["Officials: Iran may take own samples at alleged nuclear site", AP, July 28, 2015] tracked the source down without too much trouble, and confirmed that Sen. Risch's astounding disclosure is entirely factual.

Now we see evidence that the Iranians, without little effort at disguising the dirty-doings, have been busily sanitizing Parchin for at least several weeks.

Congressman Jim McGovern who, way back in 2009 when this
picture was published, rightly insisted on truth [Image Source]

If US voters and their Congressional representatives were to keep this tiny slice of the appalling marketing of the Iran Nuclear Enablement Deal (again, not the official name, but an honest title, given its effect) in mind, it might cause them difficulty in digesting self-parodyingly confident assertions like those made yesterday by a Congressional supporter of the Obama Iran deal. 

As only uber-confident politicians can, Rep. James McGovern of Worcester, Massachusetts declared [source: his media release issued yesterday]

Since this agreement was submitted to Congress, I have carefully reviewed the details, attended classified briefings with White House and State Department officials, met with nuclear experts, and heard from constituents – both those who are in favor of and opposed to the agreement. Above all else, this deal must be judged on its merits and whether it is the strongest available option to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. I firmly believe that it is. With a strong set of comprehensive restrictions, this agreement will take the clear and concrete steps needed to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. The diplomatic solution before us is not perfect, but it provides the robust framework we need to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and ensure that it remains peaceful. This agreement would establish the most intrusive inspections regime ever negotiated. And if Iran cheats...

and so on. 

Nothing personal against Representative McGovern but does he know about the surrender on Parchin? Does he have a view? Is it something that fits well with his view of a "robust framework"? Is his view on the agreement based on his insistence that the US public work from truth and full disclosure, or is it more, how to say this?, nuanced than that. (Again, nothing personal.)

We think that if Congressman McGovern fully appreciated how exposed he and his constituents are to the existential threat facing us in far-off Israel, he might have given expression to a touch more humility and recognition of how some issues go well beyond party politics. (And for the record, though we are sure we are in serious danger here, we're not at all sure Americans are in much better shape.)

And we're wondering whether he agrees that he and his parliamentary colleagues are being exposed to an incomplete segment of the available evidence. Also: that being opposed to the dangerous, defective and misleadingly marketed Iran deal - as we certainly are - doesn't mean people want war - as we certainly do not.

09-Oct-14: Iran's optimism-fuelled march towards nuclear bombs continues unhindered

IsraelDefense has the satellite images [Source]

The Iranian stonewalling goes on.

They have been in the news this week for two reasons. First, something massively damaging appears to have happened in the vicinity of their Parchin military weapons complex, the very site about which United Nations inspectors said "It is very clear that Iran doesn't want the agency to go to Parchin because it has something to hide" in 2012 [Reuters] and to which the International Atomic Energy Agency's people have been refused inspection access since 2005 [BBC] up to and including this past month [ISIS]. And secondly, because an IAEA inspection team is in Iran right now, having arrived there according to plans that were announced months earlier, on Monday.

So here is what we know today.

Explosion: As we said on Monday ["06-Oct-14: Iran's nuclear project has experienced an explosion"], two people were officially announced to have been killed but the official Iranian government reports were thin and opaque. Non-government sources said it was so powerful that windows were blown out in a 15 km radius of Parchin, the heavily-secured and vast facility about which the suspicions of everyone paying attention have been focused, and which is universally believed to be where the Iranian nuclear bombs are being brought to readiness. 

Turns out there are now pre- and post-explosion satellite images via the French satellite Pleiades. They confirm significant pieces of the speculation. An IsraelDefense article makes plain that the photographic evidence shows the denials of the Iranian government are lies:

Satellite images of the Parchin area, to the east of Tehran, prove: the explosion reported by the Iranian media had, indeed, occurred inside the military compound in Parchin, where, according to western intelligence agencies, trials are being conducted on nuclear missile fuzes. Satellite images obtained by Israel Defense and analyzed by specialist Ronen Solomon clearly show damage consistent with an attack against bunkers in a central locality within the military research complex at the Parchin military compound... The locality consists of a sizable testing center and what appears to be an area with bunker-shaped structures. "Before and after" images indicate that a complete section of structures was simply eliminated by an unexplained explosion. The explosion wiped several testing units off the face of the earth while inflicting collateral damage on adjacent buildings...

Iran's "disarmament" expert Najafi: Image Source

Talks: According to a Reuters report today, those scheduled talks in Tehran during Tuesday and Wednesday

appear not to have substantively advanced an investigation into suspected atomic bomb research by Tehran, potentially dimming chances for a broader deal between the Iranians and big powers... The IAEA has for years been trying to get to the bottom of Western intelligence reports suggesting that Iran has worked on designing a nuclear warhead. Iran has denounced the intelligence as fabricated, but has promised to work with the IAEA since last year when Hassan Rouhani, seen as a pragmatist, became president on a platform to overcome his country's international isolation...  The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a statement... that discussions would continue. But it did not announce a date for the next round of talks focused on the Vienna-based IAEA's concerns that Iran had initially been supposed to address by late August. Diplomats in the Austrian capital said it seemed that very little, if any, progress had been achieved... [By contrast] Tehran's envoy to the Vienna-based U.N. agency, Reza Najafi, said the discussions had been "very constructive", according to Iran's ISNA news agency, which did not elaborate.

How constructive? An AP report today, quoting the same Reza Najafi, Iran's "ambassador" to the IAEA, says he

confirmed that an International Atomic Energy Agency staff member was refused a visa. Najafi didn't identify the person, but told Iran's Fars news agency that he had a "particular nationality."

A Washington Post article today makes clear the "particular nationality" was, not exactly surprisingly, of the United States:

Two diplomats from IAEA member nations who spoke to The Associated Press demanded anonymity because their information is confidential. They said the U.S. expert first applied for a visa eight months ago and had been turned down several times since. [Washington Post]

Just six days ago, Najafi accused the IAEA of espionage and leaking classified information on its nuclear program:

"It is unfortunate that, once again, the agency has failed to protect classified information. While Iran and the agency made plans, news of these plans have been published in the middle of the West," Najafi said in remarks reported by the Iranian state news agency IRNA. The diplomat, who did not specify what information or what average meant, felt that this event "reconfirms the Iranian concerns about the existence of espionage activities in the agency." [Source: EFE]

When Najafi was appointed a year ago, a Reuters report fairly gushed about how the new man was a "disarmament expert" and that his appointment extended "a reshuffle of top officials dealing with its disputed atomic program since new President Hassan Rouhani took office vowing to improve Iran's foreign relations.... Rouhani has vowed Iran will be more transparent and less confrontational in talks both with the IAEA and the big powers." A year further along, and this can be filed away in the rapidly overflowing self-delusionally-optimistic drawer.

Meanwhile: In November 2013, the six major powers -- the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia -- said they had reached some kind of temporary agreement with Iran in Geneva, as a result of which all sorts of very substantial benefits immediately became available to the Iranian regime. A long-term understanding about nuclear weapons was supposed to follow by July 2014. Nothing of the sort happened. Now there's vague talk of a November 2014 deadline.

As today's developments demonstrate, there's zero likelihood of that. producing anything useful.

06-Oct-14: Iran's nuclear project has experienced an explosion

Iran's Parchin complex, in a Google Maps 2012 aerial view: 40 square
kilometers of secret military facilities dedicated to explosives,
scattered across the desert and mountains [Image Source] 

Something serious is happening in Iran, and it seems it's connected with the Iranian nuclear program. From the BBC this evening:

A fire and explosion at a military explosives facility near the Iranian capital Tehran has left at least two people dead, reports say. The semi-official Iranian Students News Agency (Isna) said the fire was in an "explosive materials production unit". A pro-opposition website reported a huge blast near the Parchin military site, south-east of the capital, but this was not confirmed. Parchin has been linked to Iran's controversial nuclear programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been given access to the complex since 2005. Analysts say the IAEA suspects Iran of experimenting with explosives capable of triggering a nuclear weapon at Parchin.

Times of Israel, quoting Iranian sources, says "the blast was so powerful it shattered windows up to 12 kilometers away and the glare from the explosion lit up the night sky." As we said, something serious.

Two and a half years ago, we posted here ["29-Feb-12: Atomic energy agency says today Iran is hiding something "very concerning""] about the rising tone of reports emanating from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, which had

told diplomats today in a three-hour long closed-door briefing in Vienna that they are "very concerned" about what is going on at Iran's Parchin military facility. The IAEA's request to visit the site, which has been flatly refused by the Tehran regime, is now more urgent. Chief inspector Herman Nackaerts said the U.N. agency was monitoring the site, southeast of Tehran, via satellite imaging. A Western diplomat who participated today is quoted saying "It is very clear that Iran doesn't want the agency to go to Parchin because it has something to hide". What might that be?

Our post goes on:

Last November [2011], the agency reported that there was “a large explosives containment vessel” at Parchin for large-scale conventional explosives tests consistent with designing a nuclear warhead for Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missiles. 

Soon afterwards, in March 2012, we wrote about how the IAEA was getting blunter in its messaging, having reached the stage where it was ready to say that on nuclear weapons development "Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation".

And exactly a month ago, while reviewing how the Obama Administration was acting and talking in the face of Iranian stonewalling ["06-Sep-14: Iran, US and opening up a new path toward a more secure world: how well is that going?"], we took a closer look at the Parchin weapons complex, and asked:

Are we closer to achieving supervision and control of Iran's no-longer-so-secret nuclear weapon ambitions? Or further away? ...

We wrote then that

Parchin is key to the whole matter: it's the Iranian military complex 30 kilometres southeast of Tehran covering some 40 square kilometres of desert and mountains with "hundreds of buildings and test sites" that are "dedicated to research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives... The IAEA continues to call on Iran to grant inspectors access to the site, although as of the spring of 2013, Iran had refused IAEA access while continuing to reconstruct the site. " [Source: ISIS] 

The IAEA has a new delegation arriving in Teheran this evening about the time that we write these words, according to an official FARS Newsagency report. (But it has no mention about today's explosion.) Anyone think they're going to get to clarity on these cloudy and increasingly dangerous issues?

06-Sep-14: Iran, US and opening up a new path toward a more secure world: how well is that going?

Iran's Parchin complex, in a Google Maps 2012 aerial view:
40 square kilometers of secret military facilities dedicated to explosives,
scattered across the desert and mountains [Image Source] 

Are we closer to achieving supervision and control of Iran's no-longer-so-secret nuclear weapon ambitions? Or further away?

Iran fails to address nuclear bomb concerns - IAEA | Fri Sep 5, 2014 | REUTERS | Fredrik Dahl
VIENNA (Reuters) - Iran has failed to address concerns about suspected atomic bomb research by an agreed deadline, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Friday, a setback to hopes for an end to an international stand-off over Tehran's atomic activity.
The lack of movement in an inquiry by the International Atomic Energy Agency will disappoint the West and could further complicate efforts by six world powers to negotiate a resolution to the decade-old dispute with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.
An IAEA report obtained by Reuters showed that little substantive headway had so far been made in the U.N. agency's long-running investigation into what it calls the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.

The International Atomic Energy Agency published its latest report [online here] yesterday. The Reuters report above intimates, though it could have said it more clearly, that the IAEA's probe into Iran's campaign to become a nuclear weapons power is completely stuck. The reason is Iranian non-cooperation. You might also call it stone-walling.

The report's Section H, the part dealing with those "possible military dimensions" (PMDs), makes clear that what has been happening and not happening is extremely disturbing. The PMDs are key to the IAEA getting a good sense of "the scope of the program... and set the baseline for the successful monitoring", in the words of Olli Heinonen, formerly the IAEA deputy director. They are quoted in an email we received today from Omri Ceren (@cerenomri) at The Israel Project, where they do invaluable work staying on top of the Iran/Nuclear issue,

As the BBC reported back on March 9, 2012, the so-called P5-plus-1 partner countries

the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and China - said in a statement: "We call on Iran to enter, without pre-conditions, into a sustained process of serious dialogue, which will produce concrete results." They called on Iran to co-operate fully with UN inspectors and allow them to visit the Parchin military site. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has previously said it suspects the Parchin site may be being used for nuclear weapons-related testing. [BBC]

President Obama, in a speech [video here] delivered in November 2013, described newly agreed "substantial limitations" with the Ayatollah-rich regime in Teheran that "cut off Iran's paths to a nuclear bomb":

Since I took office, I’ve made clear my determination to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  As I’ve said many times, my strong preference is to resolve this issue peacefully, and we’ve extended the hand of diplomacy... Today, that diplomacy opened up a new path toward a world that is more secure - a future in which we can verify that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and that it cannot build a nuclear weapon... Over the next six months, we will work to negotiate a comprehensive solution.  We approach these negotiations with a basic understanding:  Iran, like any nation, should be able to access peaceful nuclear energy. But because of its record of violating its obligations, Iran must accept strict limitations on its nuclear program that make it impossible to develop a nuclear weapon.
In these negotiations, nothing will be agreed to unless everything is agreed to.  The burden is on Iran to prove to the world that its nuclear program will be exclusively for peaceful purposes... As President and Commander-in-Chief, I will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon... Through strong and principled diplomacy, the United States of America will do our part on behalf of a world of greater peace, security, and cooperation among nations." ["Statement By The President On First Step Agreement On Iran's Nuclear Program", White House, November 23, 2103]

Talks with the Iranians then followed, along with a deadline for results. And for going down that "path", the Iranians received rich rewards: $1 billion just this past Friday, another $1 billion in April 2014, before that $8 billion in November 2013. And an end to most of the sanction-driven angst caused by the West's response to Iran's ongoing nuclear crusade.

Seven weeks ago, the NY Times reported that

Iran, the United States and the five other countries negotiating the future of the Iranian nuclear program have agreed to a four-month extension of the talks, giving them more time to try to bridge major differences over whether Tehran will be forced to dismantle parts of its nuclear infrastructure... ["Negotiators Agree to Extend Iran Nuclear Talks Four More Months, Diplomats Say", NY Times, July 18, 2014]

So with those talks going (as it appears) essentially nowhere, where have those IAEA investigations led?

In its Friday report, the IAEA says that the Iranians are continuing to destroy and pave over Parchin. Parchin is key to the whole matter: it's the Iranian military complex 30 kilometres southeast of Tehran covering some 40 square kilometres of desert and mountains with "hundreds of buildings and test sites" that are "dedicated to research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives... The IAEA continues to call on Iran to grant inspectors access to the site, although as of the spring of 2013, Iran had refused IAEA access while continuing to reconstruct the site. " [Source: ISIS] There's an aerial view in the photo above.

Here's part of what the Friday report says:

At the Parchin site, the Agency has observed through satellite imagery ongoing construction activity that appears to show the removal/replacement or refurbishment of the site’s two main buildings’ external wall structures. One of these buildings has also had a section of its roof removed and replaced. Observations of deposits of material and/or debris, and equipment suggest that construction activity has expanded to two other site buildings. These [Iranian regime] activities are likely to have further undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification. It remains important for Iran to provide answers to the Agency’s questions and access to the particular location in question. [Report by the IAEA Director General, September 5, 2014, page 12]

And here's how, in the same report published yesterday, the Director General of the IAEA sums out his organization's suspicions and Iran's 'helpfulness':

Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. The Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The Agency has obtained more information since November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex. [Report by the IAEA Director General, September 5, 2014, page 12]

And Iran's response till now?

In February 2012, Iran dismissed the Agency’s concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations. In a letter to the Agency dated 28 August 2014, Iran stated that “most of the issues” in the Annex to GOV/2011/65 were “mere allegations and do not merit consideration”.

If, like us, you are depressed by the brief chronicle above, you might think these two news items from the past 24 hours deepen the gloom. We certainly do:

• Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the world is entering a “new order” as the West's influence wanes and that officials in the Islamic Republic need to be aware of the changes and prepare to play a role in the new context... “When the world is changing, when global order is changing and a new order is being formed, naturally we have a more important duty.” The first thing to be done is to understand the new world order correctly, Khamenei said. “The power of the West on their two foundations — values and thoughts and the political and military — have become shaky. We have to understand this” rather than submitting to the idea of Western superiority". ["Ayatollah Khamenei urges Iran to prepare for 'new world order'", Al-Monitor, September 6, 2014]
• A charter airplane carrying American military contractors through Iranian airspace was instructed to land in Iran on Friday. The airplane, chartered by the international military coalition in Afghanistan, was flying from Bagram Air Base north of Kabul to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates when it ran into trouble with Iranian air traffic controllers over its flight plan. The plane was rerouted to the coastal Iranian city of Bandar Abbas, where it landed pending a resolution of the issue. It was later allowed to depart Iran, and by Friday night, the plane had landed in Dubai, officials said.“This is nothing to get alarmed over,” said an Obama administration official, who like other American officials insisted on anonymity to discuss a potentially delicate diplomatic situation. “This is a bureaucratic problem with the flight plan, and it’s going to be resolved shortly. This is not a political statement.” The administration denied initial media reports that Iranian jets had forced down the plane. “It was all done on the radio,” a senior Pentagon official said. “It was just a bad flight plan.” ["Jet Carrying Contractors Is Ordered to Land in Iran", NY Times, September 5, 2014]

7-Mar-13: Iran and its nuclear program: the state of play

From the IAEA website: Iran's Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh speaks with other
delegates at yesterday's IAEA Board of Governors
gathering in Vienna [Image Source]

As the Iranians rattle their sabres, the Americans raise their voices and the Europeans appeal yet again for patience, time and mutual understanding, it gets mighty uncomfortable sitting here in Israel and waiting to see whether the ayatollahs mean what they and their henchman say, or whether it's all just poker.

There was a closed-door meeting in Vienna yesterday of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 35-nation governing board. Reuters reported on it here. The Iranian factor played a role. Here are the highlights.

• Iran's representive to the gathering, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, is a diplomat with a not-so-diplomatic approach. Reuters reports that he took the opportunity to accuse Israel of "genocide". The context? A debate about Syria.
• The U.S. ambassador to IAEA, Joseph Macmanus, walked out when the Iranian said this. Officials from Canada, New Zealand and Australia did the same. All three came back to the room a little while later.
• Macmanus had earlier spoken about Iran's "commitment to deception, defiance, and delay" in addressing the charges made by IAEA about Iran's covert nuclear weapons-related research. "Iran is inviting further isolation, pressure and censure from the international community... until it meets its obligations and addresses the board's concerns," he said. It has engaged in "provocative actions", particularly the installation of advanced centrifuges that would enable it to speed up its uranium enrichment.
• Representatives of the European Union called on Iran to "stop obstructing an IAEA investigation" and "give the agency access to sites and documents".
• Part of the meeting was explicitly devoted to IAEA's problems with Iran. During the Iran discussion, its representative - Soltanieh - said  allegations over what Iran is really doing are "baseless". It is the IAEA, and not Tehran, that should be blamed for delays in the IAEA's inquiry into Iran's true intentions and actions, according to Soltanieh. And anyway, he said, "Nuclear weapons have no place in the defense doctrine of Iran."
• The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) report from November 2011 suggests differently. It says Iran is developing nuclear weapons and that there is a need to address this as soon as possible. 
• The head of IAEA is Yukiya Amano, a 65-year-old Japanese diplomat. He was appointed to a second four-year term on Wednesday. Amano said he wants to help resolve the Iran nuclear issue through diplomatic means. "For that I need cooperation from Iran," he said yesterday. Back in November 2011, he said "It is my responsibility to alert the world. From the indicators I had, I draw the conclusion that it is time to call the world's attention to this risk."
• Reuters editorializes that IAEA has tried for more than a year to persuade Iran to give it the access it says it needs for its investigation, but without progress. Iran has refused IAEA requests to visit the Parchin military site, where IAEA inspectors suspect explosives tests relevant for nuclear weapons development took place, possibly a decade ago.
• The Reuters report helpfully points out that the Iranians have often criticized Israeli policies towards the Palestinians and have said Israel would be wiped "off the face of the earth" if the Jewish state attacked Iran.

Time to mention Iran's friends. It has those, of course. (And we are not referring to Syria and Hezbollah whom the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council calls its partners in the “Axis of Resistance”.) For instance

• In the event that Israel attacks Iran before Iran crosses the US red line, Zbigniew Brzezinski does not think there is any “implicit obligation” for the US “to follow, like a stupid mule, whatever the Israelis do” [Source: RT, November 2012]. Brzezinski served as United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter between 1977 and 1981.
• Following the November 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency report that said Iran was well on its way to developing the capacity to make nuclear weapons, Chinese and Russian diplomats announced right away that they believed no new sanctions on Iran were necessary. One report said ["China: Iran's New Best Friend"] that "China is Iran's largest trading partner, and this year alone business between the two is estimated at $40 billion, enough of an incentive, say analysts, to block any meaningful Security Council action."
• Earlier this week, the 24th fleet of Iran's Navy, docked at China's port city of Zhangjiagang where it conducted 'training exercises", after a voyage of 13,000 kilometers in 40 days [source: Iran's PressTV channel]. En route, it "successfully intercepted 1,180 trade and tanker ships and monitored more than 120 military units using optical and electronic devices" which was presumably said in a spirit of proving how friendly and accommodating the Iranians are. For insight of a similar kind, see this December 2012 report ["Iran's ever-growing influence scares Zionist-Imperialist rulers"] also from PressTV.
• A previous head (the one before Mohamed ElBaradei) of IAEA, Hans Blix, appears today in the Iranian media dismissing what he terms the “overhyped” Western propaganda over the "threat of nuclear-armed Iran". He says there is no evidence that Tehran is even interested in producing weapons of mass destruction.
• Also in today's news: Pakistan is going to complete a $7.5 billion gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan "despite pressure from the United States" [source], according to a spokesperson for the Pakistani foreign ministry speaking today to a press conference in Islamabad. The ministry also announced that Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari plans to visit Iran this coming Monday for the project's groundbreaking.
• And a European Union court judgement handed down in the last month [see Reuters report] means that the EU is instructed to lift sanctions imposed on Bank Saderat, one of Iran's largest banks. This came shortly after a similar ruling to the same effect concerning Bank Mellat, Iran's largest private sector lender. Reuters said the judgments would complicate Western efforts to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic.

Finally, a brief extract from an op-ed in the Washington Times today, penned by Reza Kahlili, the  pseudonym of a former CIA operative in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and author of the award-winning book “A Time to Betray”. The piece is entitled "The West’s dangerous naivete on Iranian nukes":

Iran has long thought that the West, particularly America, will do everything it can to avoid a military confrontation, leaving negotiations and sanctions as the West’s only options. It thinks that eventually the West will realize that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be stopped and, therefore, will look for a way out of this dilemma by reducing sanctions and finally accepting a nuclear-armed Iran. Gen. Rahim Safavi, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards and currently a special adviser to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a recent speech that America regrets its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and cannot repeat another war.

Understand why we're uncomfortable?