18-Jan-13: When the Iranians deny their nuclear plans, what do they actually mean?

Nuclear weaponry? Read my Ahmadinejadian lips: No way, and I really
and truly mean it [Image Source]

Here's a fresh, first-person account penned by a former Iranian foreign ministry interpreter who is currently seeking political asylum in Turkey. It appears online here under the title "Don’t be fooled: Iran wants the bomb".

• As a former employee of the Iranian foreign ministry, I served as an interpreter for visiting dignitaries, diplomats and officials. I was also present at inner-circle conversations in which a number of high-profile Iranian officials made no secret of their intention to go atomic.
• At a private meeting in April 2005 at the home of Mohsen Rezai, the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council and a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Rezai strongly advocated the idea of acquiring nuclear bombs for "deterrent purposes." He referred to such a weapon as a "holy Islamic bomb" and noted that even Khomeini approved of acquiring an atomic bomb to safeguard the interests of Islam during the Iran-Iraq war. He argued that everything is allowed for the sake of Islam, including using WMDs and the mass killing of civilians.
• In early 2012, I heard Ali Bagheri, the deputy secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, say that "we should expedite our efforts and diversify our secret [nuclear] facilities to achieve our goal before it is too late."
• In early February 2012, I was present at a confidential meeting at which Iran's deputy head of the Islamic Revolution Mostazafan Foundation was negotiating with the North Korean ambassador in order to obtain nuclear technology for Iran in exchange for financial support.
• I witnessed Iranian involvement in the mass production of chemical weapons at a variety of installations including Pakshooma, Arak Petrochemical Complex and in particular the Shahid Meisami Complex located in the city of Karaj, which were producing chemical weapons for the Defense Industries Organization, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense. I interpreted as the Iranian defense officials misinformed and deceived international chemical weapons inspectors.
• All previous meetings between Iran and the 5+1 failed because Iran was never serious about curbing its nuclear programs. Using a well-known concept in Shiite jurisprudence known as the expedient or altruistic lie, Iranian officials are perfectly willing to lie when it comes to their intentions and programs.

The voice of this former employee of the Iranian foreign service needs be heard when he declares on the basis of an insider's experience: "Iranian officials are perfectly willing to lie when it comes to their intentions and programs".